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Joe Tidy, a cyber correspondent, outlines the details of end-to-end encryption.
The government has dismissed speculation that it is shifting its approach to require messaging apps to provide the regulator Ofcom with access to users' private messages.
A stalemate has arisen between the UK government and tech firms over a certain provision in the Online Safety Bill concerning encrypted messages.
Only the sender and recipient can view these messages.
The Bill stipulates that, in the event of suspected child abuse material, tech companies could be required to inspect it.
Platforms such as WhatsApp, Signal and iMessage have warned that they would leave the UK if they were forced to breach existing privacy protections in order to access or view any messages sent through their services. Such an action would be detrimental to the security of all users.
For several months, the discussion surrounding the issue of privacy versus security had become heated, with some groups viewing it as an argument. However, the government strongly insists that they do not have to choose one or the other; both are desired.
The Online Safety Bill is due to be approved in the fall and is to be given its last examination in the House of Lords on Wednesday.
The government made an admission in the House of Lords this afternoon that the technology necessary to access messaging without breaching security protocols does not currently exist. They contended, however, that their stance had not altered.
Indeed, earlier versions of the Bill stipulate that Ofcom, the regulator, would only require tech firms to access messages after technology with the capacity to only target child abuse content and not break encryption had been developed and was feasible.
Tech firms have been assigned the responsibility of developing these tools.
The government spokesperson stated that the Bill gives the power to Ofcom to, when all privacy precautionary measures are satisfied, on a situation-by-situation basis and as a final option, direct companies to utilize, or make all attempts to create or get hold of, technology that can detect and take away illegal child sexual abuse content - which, it is acknowledged, can be devised.
Several safety specialists have indicated that this type of technology may not come into being, and the companies that make it have stated that it is unattainable.
Amber Kak, who is on the Signal secure messaging app board, posted with the intent to make people reconsider the influx of plans based on similar illogical notions.
Matthew Hodgkinson, the operator of the UK-located messaging service Elements, declared that the newest iteration of the bill was evading its obligations.
He noted that all the phrase "until it's technically feasible" referred to was the possibility of scanning at some point in the future, rather than scanning now.
An alternate perspective suggests this could be a last-ditch attempt to arrive at a diplomatic solution, allowing neither the tech companies nor the government to appear as losers: the government could assert that it was aware from the start the technology did not exist and thus back off from any immediate demands from the tech firms to come up with it, and at the same time the tech firms could be seen as having achieved a victory for privacy.
Presently, two of the most probable technical solutions are breaking the encryption - which could leave a backdoor exposed to any malicious individuals who locate it - or employing software to scan the content on a device. This is typically referred to as client-side scanning, and critics have labeled it "the spy in your pocket."
The NSPCC and other organisations devoted to helping children have characterised encrypted messaging as a "front line" in the fight against child abuse due to the protection offered by its privacy settings.
Privacy advocates assert that everyone deserves to have their privacy safeguarded.wright
Reporting supplemented by Liv McMahon and Philippa Wainwright
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Contributions from Liv McMahon and Philippa Wainwright
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